



Issue No. 39, Fall 2002

AAASS 34th NATIONAL CONVENTION NOVEMBER 21 - 24, 2002 PITTSBURGH, PA

The 34th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) will take place November 21-24, 2002 at the Hilton Pittsburgh and the Omni William Penn hotels in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

HOTELS

The Convention will be held in two hotels, the Hilton Pittsburgh and the Omni William Penn. The Hilton will be the main hotel. To make reservation at the Hilton, dial 1-800-445-8667 or 412-391-4600, fax 412-467-3440. The room rate is \$114 per night (plus 14% room tax). You must indicate that you are with Slavic Studies to receive the discounted rate.

Omni William Penn is the overflow hotel. The reservation numbers are 1-800-843-6664 and 412-553-5193. The room rate is also \$114.00 plus tax. Please indicate that you are with Slavic Studies. Reserve your rooms on time!

TRAVEL

US Airways has been designated as the official carrier for the attendees of the AAASS Convention in Pittsburgh. Discounts are available between November 18-27, 2002. If you are going to use US Airways services, please call US Airways Group and Meeting Reservation Office toll free at 877-874-7687. You must refer to Gold File No. 88112385. You may book your flight on-line with usairways.com using Meeting ID: MGT000392. In order to get the full discount rate book your flight on time!

I do not have any specific information on ground transportation from the Pittsburgh airport to the hotels, but I am sure that there is a convenient bus service from the airport to the downtown hotels.

REGISTRATION FEES

AAASS Members \$65.00, Students \$25.00; Non-Members \$75.00, Students \$30.00; On-site registration is \$15.00 higher (for students \$5.00). Reception tickets are \$30.00 (students \$10.00).

For more information concerning the Convention you may access AAASS website at: [http: <www.fas.harvard.edu/~aaass>](http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~aaass) following panels are sponsored by the ACS and its members, or ACS members are participating in them, and/or deal with themes that might be of interest to the Croatians attending the Convention.

PANELS

The

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21

2:00 - 3:50 P. M.

Session 1, Panel 01

Room: Allegheny (Hilton)

Panel: Geography and Politics: Perspectives on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sponsored by the Association for Croatian Studies.

Chair: Joseph T. Bombelles, John Carroll U

Papers: Mladen Klemencic, U of Zagreb (Croatia). "Croatian View(s) on Regional Cooperation."

Gerard Toal, Virginia Tech. "Bosnia as a Political Geography Experiment."

Joachim Weber, U of Hamburg (Germany). "European Integration and the Traffic Infrastructure of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Disc.: Zdenka Gredel-Manuele,

Niagara U

Session 1, Panel 15

Room: Le Bateau (Hilton).

Paper: Gordana Crnkovic, U of Washington. "Facts and Fiction of the War: Examples from the Croatian Literature of the 1990s."

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 22

8:00 A. M. - 9:50 A. M.

Session 3, Panel 04

Room: Brigade (Hilton)

Panel: The War in Bosnia Reexamined.

Session 3, Panel 23

Room: Allegheny (Omni)

Paper: Dean Vuletic (Yale U).

“Homosexuality and Nation in Croatia.”

10:15 A. M. - 12:05 P. M.

Session 4, Panel 02

Room: Benedum (Hilton)

Papers: Paula Pickering, The College of William and Mary. “Sites for Building Social Capital across Lines of Difference in Bosnia -Herzegovina.”

Tammy Ann Smith, Columbia U. “Between Strong and Weak Ties: Lessons in Trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

Session 4, Panel 06

Room: Duquesne (Hilton)

Paper: Michael Edward Biggins, U of Washington. “Publishing Trends in Slovenia and Croatia.”

Session 4, Panel 13

Room: King’s Garden North (Hilton)

Panel: South Slavic Americans and the Left, 1900-1950.

Chair: Charles Jelavich, Indiana U

Papers: Ivan Cizmic, U of Zagreb (Croatia) “The Yugoslav Socialist Federation, 1900-1919.”

Matjaz Klemencic, U of Maribor (Slovenia) “Slovene American Leftist Organizations, 1900-1950.”

Jason C. Vuic, Indiana U. “American Radicals: Steve Nelson and Stevan Dedijer.”

Disc: Thomas Allen Emmert, Gustavus Adolphus College.

Session 4, Panel 17

Room: Rivers (Hilton)

Paper: Josip Mocnik, Bowling Green State U. "US-Slovene Relations: Is Slovenia a Success Story?"

Session 4, Panel 23

Room: Allegheny (Omni)

Paper: Robert E. Gillette, IREX. "Building and Protecting Independent Media in Bosnia: A View from the Field."

Session 5, Panel 02

Room: Benedum (Hilton)

Panel: Imagining Slavic Identity in Central Europe.

Session 5, Panel 22

Room: Traders (Hilton)

Panel: In Allied London: The War of the Exiles, 1939-1945.

Paper: Laurie West Van Hook, US

State Dept, Historian's Office "Coping with the Exiles: The British and the Yugoslavs in Wartime London."

Session 5, Panel 29

Room: Conference Center D (Omni)

Panel: Organized Crime, Corruption, and Terrorist Groups in the Balkans.

Paper: David Kanin, CIA."Organized Crime and Corruption in the Balkans: An Overview."

Session 6, Panel 03

Room: Board Room (Hilton)

Panel: "Like Some Wolf or Tiger Spreading His Scent": Political Ritual and Territorial Marking in Late Habsburg Central Europe.

Paper: Sarah Anne Kent, U of Wisconsin, Stevens Point. "State Ritual and Ritual Parody: Croatian Student Protests in 1895 and the Faltering of Celebrity Monarchism."

Session 6, Panel 19

Room: Sterlings (Hilton)

Roundtable: Virtual Archives: Challenges and Recent Developments

Participant - Tatjana Bujas Lorkovic, Yale U

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 23

8:00 A. M. - 9:50 A. M.

Session 7, Panel 15

Panel: Yugoslav Americans and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s

Chair: Ivan Cizmic, U of Zagreb (Croatia)

Papers: Ivan Miletic. "Croatian Americans and Croatia in 1990s."

John David Treadway, U of Richmond "Secessionist Politics in Montenegro at the Crossroads of 2000s and Serbian and Montenegrin Americans."

Dragoljub Zivojinovic, U of Belgrade (Yugoslavia). "Serbian Americans and the Events of the 1990s"

Disc: Matijaz Klemencic, U of Maribor (Slovenia)

10:15 A. M. - 12:05 P. M.

Session 8, Panel 01

Room: Allegheny (Hilton)

Panel: Bosnia in the Aftermath of the War.

Session 8, Panel 31

Room: Frick (Omni)

Paper: Irene Hanson Frieze, U of Pittsburgh. "Changing Ideas About Future Jobs in Young Adults in Slovenia and Croatia." (with Anuska Perligoj, Jasna Horvat, and Natasa Sarlija)

Session 8, Panel 36

Room: Phipps (Omni)

Paper: Yana Hashamova, Ohio State U "Dubravka Ugresic: Philosopher of Evil and Exile."

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 24

8:00 A. M. - 9:50 A. M.

Session 10, Panel 04

Room: Brigade (Hilton)

Panel: Ideological Differentiations and Politics in Croatia and the Region between Two World Wars.

Chair: Jerome Jareb, St. Francis U

Papers: Mario Jareb, Indiana U "Ustasa Movement (1929-1941): Ideological Background and Activities in Comparison with Similar Movements and Political Parties in Central Europe."

Jure Kristo, Croatian Institute of History (Croatia) "Ideological and Political Strife among Croatian Catholics between the Two World Wars."

Vjeran Pavlakovic, U of Washington "Federalism, Internationalism, and Revolution: The Croatian Left in the 1930s."

Chair: Mirjana Morosini-Dominick, Georgetown U

Session 10, Panel 30

Room: Conference Center E (Omni)

Roundtable: Christianity, Islam, and Civil Religion in Southeast Europe.

Participants:

Ante Cuvalo, Joliet Jr College

Robert J. Donia, U of Michigan

Kemal H. Karpat, U of Wisconsin

Stjepan Mestrovic, Texas A&M U

Paul Mojzes, Rosemont College

Sabrina P. Ramet, Norwegian U of Science and Technology

10:15 A. M. - 12:05 P. M.

Session 11, Panel 32

Room: Heinz (Omni)

Panel: Croatian Language and Holy Books of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.

Chair: Anita Mikulic-Kovacevic, U of Toronto (Canada)

Papers: Vinko Grubisic, U of Waterloo (Canada). "Alphabets in Bosnia and Herzegovina Before the Ottoman Occupation."

Ivo Soljan, Grand Valley State U. "The Re-birth of the Croatian Language: Croatian in the Linguistic Revolution of the Renaissance Europe."

Elisabeth von Erdmann, Erlangen University, (Germany). "Holy Books in the Vernacular and Standardization of the Croatian Language."

Disc: Ellen Ellias Bursac, Harvard U

UNFAIR

Out of four panels organized by the ACS members, one is on the first and three on the last day of the Convention. It is a well-known fact that those are the days when many participants are either arriving or leaving the AAASS National Conventions. Moreover, two of the panels on Sunday, November 24, are to take place at the same time, from 8:00 to 9:50 A.M. This is unfair to the ACS members and participants.

Already in May, I have expressed my dissatisfaction to the Convention coordinator, Ms Walker, regarding the session I organized and requested a change in scheduling but, as usual, no one responded to my message.

I urge the panel organizers, participants, and other ACS members to express their displeasure with such insensitivity regarding the Convention scheduling.

ACS ANNUAL MEETING

The ACS annual meeting was scheduled by the Program Committee for Thursday, November 21, 2002 at 4:15 P. M., Room: Monongahela (Omni). However, as this is the first day of the Convention and some of our members and friends will be arriving that afternoon, the meeting is postponed for Saturday, November 23, 2002, at 3:00 P. M. in the above mentioned room. According to the Preliminary Program, the room will be free at that time. Stay in touch with Ante Cuvalo while in Pittsburgh, and if there are any changes you will be inform on time. We do urge the ACS members and friends to attend this important annual meeting.

DINNER

We will look for a suitable place and time for the ACS members and friends attending the Convention to get together for the ACS annual "Croatian Dinner." If you are coming to the Convention, please let Ante Cuvalo know if you and your friends are interested in joining us for this event.

AAASS CONVENTION 2003

The AAASS 35th National Convention will be in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, November 20-23, 2003.

Those who are interested in organizing a panel and/or presenting a paper dealing with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Croatians at the next AAASS convention, please let us know before November 21, 2002.

Panel proposals for next year's AAASS Convention have to be submitted soon after this year's Convention.

NEW MEMBERS

HELEN BLAGDAN

Helen Blagdan is a life-long American Croatian activist. She was born and raised in Chicago, and she worked for many years overseas for the American government. After retiring, she went back to school and received a BA in history from DePaul University about a year ago. Presently, she is working on her MA. She loves to study, travel, and be involved in various Croatian American activities. Her generosity and dynamism is well known and respected.

THERESA URSIC

Theresa Ursic was born in the U.S.. Both of her parents came from the island of Solta. She received her PhD in history from the University of Michigan in 1997. Her dissertation, Religious Freedom in Post-World War II Yugoslavia - The Case of Roman Catholic Nuns in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina 1945-1960, was published by the International Scholars Publications in 2001. She teaches history at Los Angeles Junior College.

ACS MEMBERS AND FRIENDS

JEROME JAREB

Jere Jareb didn't spend this summer in Croatia, as he and his wife have done in the last few years. This spring, he fell and also had some other health complications. Nothing too serious, but he is home bound for now. We wish him a speedy recovery.

ELINOR MURRAY DESPALATOVIC

Elinor M. Despalatovic has retired from teaching at Connecticut College. She has been a professor of history in the college for 36 years. Retiring from teaching will give her extra time not only to be with her family (especially her grandchildren), but also to do more research and writing. She will be busy as ever. We wish her an enjoyable and productive future, without scheduling, grading, and turnpapers

ELSIE IVANCICH DUNIN

Elsie Ivancich Dunin, Professor Emerita (Dance Ethnology), the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), has been very active in her field during the last few years. Here are some of her endeavors since 1994:

Currently: dance research advisor with the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research

Organizer of two symposia:

July 2-8, 2000

Biennial meeting of the International Council of Traditional Music (ICTM) Study Group on Ethnochoreology, held in Korcula. Local sponsors were the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research in Zagreb and the Tourist Board of Korcula town. The two themes of the meeting were "Sword dances and

related calendrical dance events" and "Revival: reconstruction and revitalization" [of dances and dance events]. This Korcula-based meeting attracted 80 participants, the largest number of any prior ethnochoreology symposium. The meeting overlapped the opening of Korcula fifth annual

summer-long Sword Dance Festival that features the village “linked” sword dance groups and the Korcula town “mock sword dance battle” Moreska groups.

In addition the Hrvatska Radio Televizija (HRT) premiered its showing of “Ples od Boja” documentary record of the reconstruction of the Pupnat village

Kumpanija.

July 3-6, 2001

An invitational mini-symposium, MORESKA: PAST AND PRESENT, held in Korcula, sponsored by the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research and the Tourist Board of Korcula town. Ten scholars in the fields of dance history, ethnochoreology, anthropology, sociology and ethnomusicology from Croatia, Spain, Italy, Belgium, England and United States presented recent research related to the Moreska dance form. In addition, the symposium included a roundtable discussion with current and past moreskanti (performers of the Korcula Moreska), and the Korcula City Museum opened its KORCULA’S MORESKA exhibition.

Editor of Symposium Proceedings: Co-editor with Tvrtko Zebec, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21st SYMPOSIUM OF THE ICTM STUDY GROUP ON ETHNOCHOREOLOGY, 2000 KORCULA, published by the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research, Zagreb, 2001.

Two unpublished research paper presentations: 2000 “20th-16th century comparative links: Yaqui Indians (North America); Lastovo Island (European Mediterranean).” (Presented to the 21st symposium of the ICTM Study Group on Ethnochoreology, held in Korcula, Croatia)

2002 “Iconography: dance motifs on Dubrovnik area gravestones” as part of a panel on Dance Iconography. (Presented to the 22nd Symposium of the ICTM Study Group on Ethnochoreology, held in Szeged, Hungary.

Three published articles:

2001 “Oznake u vremenu: kostimi i scenske znacajke u izvedbi bojevnih

macevnih plesova” [Markers in time: costume and scenic characteristics of

mock combat sword dance performances]. NARODNA UMJETNOST 38(2):163-174. Zagreb: Institut za Etnologiju i Folkloristiku.

2001 “Continuities and changes: Interrelationships of ritual and social

dance contexts in Dubrovnik-area villages.” YEARBOOK FOR TRADITIONAL MUSIC 33:99-107. Los Angeles: International Council for Traditional Music; Department of Ethnomusicology, University of California.

2002 “Korcula’s Moreska in the Americas.” Alena Fazinic (editor),

GODISNJAK GRADA KORCULE 7: 193-214. Korcula: Gradski Muzej. (Summary in Croatian.)

Prof. Dunin continues to work on other projects.

MIRJANA N. DEDAIC

Mirjana Dedaic Nelson and her husband Dan have returned to the USA after almost three years in Europe.

Dan is now Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of New Haven. Mirjana will be defending her dissertation at Georgetown University in the near future.

Their e-mail addresses are:

dnelson@newhaven.edu;

dedaicm@georgetown.edu

VJERAN PAVLAKOVIC

Vjeran Pavlakovic, graduate student at the University of Washington, was awarded an IREX grant for 6 months, and a Fulbright award for 9 months to research his topic of Croatians in the Spanish Civil War. He will be living in Zagreb for about 15 months. However, he is coming to the Pittsburgh Convention in November.

MEGHAN HAYS

Meghan Hays received two Master's degrees, both from the University of Michigan, in April 2002: 1. Master of Science in Information, School of Information, with a specialization in Archives and Records Management— basically, a Master's in Library Science, with training to be an Archivist; 2. Master of Arts, Russian and East European Studies. One of her research areas is the early women education in Croatia

She and her husband, a professor at Case Western Reserve University, had a baby last year. Henry Solomon Crampton-Hays joined his sister Hazel Eleanor Crampton-Hays on May 3, 2001.

Meghan would like to be in touch with members of the Croatian community in the Cleveland area.

JOSEPH BOMBELLES

Joseph Bombelles, former president of the ACS, will be teaching in Croatia as a Fulbright Scholar this academic year.

The first semester, he will be at the University of Zagreb, and the second at the University of Rijeka. However, he is coming to the AAASS Convention in Pittsburgh.

MIRJANA

MOROSINI-DOMINICK

In May 2002, Mirjana Morosini-Dominick participated in a conference on “The Contours of Legitimacy in Central Europe: New Approaches in Graduate Studies” at Oxford University. Her paper, “Defining Identity and Ethnic Relations in Trieste 1891-1914,” was very well received. She was able to further explore this theme by spending two months in Europe (Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia) conducting a pre-dissertational research.

As a joint degree student, working towards a Ph. D. in History and a Master in German and European Studies, Georgetown University, she is interested in analyzing the identities of the Italian-Slavic borderlands at the turn of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. Both trips were sponsored jointly by the BMW Center for German and European Studies and the History Department at Georgetown University.

MARIO JAREB

Our friend and a participant at this year’s AAASS Convention is finishing his doctoral dissertation. Mario was a Fulbright scholar at Indiana University last year.

DZAFER KULENOVIC

Currently, serves as the Secretary of the Bosniak Congress for North America.

MATE MARAS

Mate Maras, up to recently a minister counselor for cultural affairs at the Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in the US, has recently moved back to Croatia. He will be working as a commentator on the Croatian Radio.

We enjoyed cooperating with Dr. Maras during his stay in Washington and we wish him and his wife Dunja the best in their new endeavors.

MARIJA AND IVAN TUSKAN

This summer, Drs. Marija and Ivan Tuskan from Cincinnati Ohio, long-time ACS members, have donated over 300 valuable items (pictures, sculptures, books of art, etc) to the Museum of

Art and Craft in Zagreb. The donated paintings are works of J. Crnobori, E. Murtic, Lj. Sestic, I. Lackovic Croata, I. Vecenaj, T. Krizman, B. Senoa, J. Kljakovic, M. Makanac, C. Dujsin Ribar, M. Kruslin, J. Buzan, P. Maruna, V. Miroslavjevic, and D. Kokotovic. The sculptures are works by I. Mestrovic and J. Turkalj.

JASNA MEYER

Recently, Jasna Meyer received her tenure at McDaniel College and she was promoted to Associate Professor of Communication.

DEANIE GUDAC

Deanie Gudac, after working for the city of Joliet for many years, retired a few years ago, moved to Florida with her husband Ron, went back to school, and received an MA in Mass Communications/Journalism Studies from USF this spring. Her research focused on Florida's newest immigrants from the "Balkans" and how the refugee programs work. The project was published in a three part series.

EDWARD J. DAMICH

This May, Judge Edward J. Damich was elevated to Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Federal Claims by President George W. Bush. He was appointed Judge of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims by President Clinton in October 1988. From 1995-98, Judge Damich served as Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee. He was a professor of law at George Mason University and at the Delaware Law School of Widener University. Among many other functions, Judge Damich was also President of the National Federation of Croatian Americans.

IVAN RUNAC

Ivan Runac, a grad student from Chicago, is enrolled at Central European University, Budapest. He is pursuing studies in history. The main focus of his research is peasant participation during the 19th century national revival movements in Croatia-Slavonia.

DONATIONS

Blagdan, Helen \$100.00

Strmski, Vlado \$20.00

CROATIAN GLAGOLITIC BOOKS IN THE USA

Croatian Glagolitic script represents probably the most original cultural monument of Croatia. We intend to list some of the most interesting glagolitic books and manuscripts through a series

of articles. Except in Croatia itself, numerous Croatian Glagolitic manuscripts are held in 24 countries, in about 60 cities, mostly in national libraries and museums.

The Princeton University library, Princeton, USA, is in possession of one leaf of the beautiful Second Vrbnik Missal from 1462. The leaf is the only one missing from the book, cut out probably in the beginning of the 20th century. After James O'Brien discovered it around 1970 in the library, he tried to get it back to Croatia, to the Second Vrbnik Missal where it used to be for centuries, but in vain.

The leaf was named Garrett MS. 25 after a certain Robert Garrett (Magg Brothers from London) who donated it to the Library in 1942. Garrett purchased it probably no later than in the 1920s. It would be nice to rename it to, say, Vrbnik MS 25.

If you happen to be in New York, we strongly recommend you pay a visit to The Pierpont Morgan Library where you will find a beautiful Croatian Glagolitic Missal (1400-1410) - known as the New York Missal. It was reprinted by Verlag Otto Sagner, Munich in 1977. Written in the region of Zadar or Lika- Krbava, it is known to have been in the possession of Frederick North, fifth Earl of Guilford (1766-1827). In 1830 it was bought by Sir Thomas Phillips, a famous British collector. The underbidder was probably Sir Frederic Madden, for the British Museum. Phillips paid a colossal price for this manuscript at the Guilford sale. It was often produced at his "desserts of manuscripts" for the admiration of visitors. This codex was considered by Sir Thomas Phillips to be one of his chief treasures. By the way, his huge collection is described in a series of as many as 73 books.

In 1966 The New York Missal was bought by the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York, and reprinted under the title "The New York Missal," published by Otto Sagner Verlag (Munich) in 1977, with an introduction by Henrik Birnbaum (UCLA, USA). It is interesting that a student of professor Birnbaum, Andrew Corin, defended his doctoral thesis dealing with this Croatian Glagolitic jewel. The theses was subsequently published under the title "The New York Missal: A Palaeographic and Phonetic Analysis," 272 pp, 1991, UCLA, Los Angeles, USA. We invite you to visit www.hr/hrvatska/Croatia-HCS.html for more information.

Darko Zubrinic, "Matica," June 2002, p. 41.

In Memoriam
STJEPAN HRASTOVEC
(1909-2002)

A well-known Croatian diaspora poet and former journalist, Stjepan Hrastovec, died in Windsor, Ontario, on March 15, 2002. He was born in Kucan Gornji near Varazdin on December 10, 1909. Stjepan studied in Zagreb, at the Archdiocesan Gymnasium and the Faculty of Law. During World War II, he was a newspaper correspondent. After the war, he escaped from socialist Yugoslavia and via Austria came to Canada.

Hrastovec was an accomplished poet. Some of his works were included in various anthologies of Croatian poetry. While in Croatia, his verses were published in "Luc," "Selo i grad," "Obitelj," and "Hrvatska povijest." During the decades of his life in Canada, he published in

“Hrvatska revija,” “Danica,” “Hrvatski kalendar,” and other emigrant publications. Collections of his poetry and prose were published under the following titles: “Budna zemlja” (1940), “Darovi vremena” (1978), “Tragom rijeci” (1989), “Na rubu zemlje” (1994), “Prisni sadržaji” (1995 & 1997) and “Vidjenja i prividjenja (1999).

NAPREDAK

1902-2002

CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION

This Fall, Croatian Cultural Association “Napredak” is celebrating its 100th birthday. The following events are scheduled festivities for the occasion.

MOSTAR

September 14, 2002

11:00 AM - Solemn Mass at the Franciscan Church

Noon - Unveiling of the 100th Anniversary Commemorative plaque

1:00 PM - Solemn Assembly and Program at the Dom Herceg Stjepan Kosaca

SARAJEVO

September 6 and 7

Symposium on history and work of Napredak (Theological Faculty Vrhbosna)

September 14

Chess Tournament/Napredak chess clubs. (Club Lira)

September 21

Scaling the Mount Bjelasinca /Napredak mountain climbers.

September 27

7:00 PM- Exhibit “100 years of Napredak.”(Gallery Collegium Artisticum)

September 28

The Main Celebration

11:00 AM -Solemn Academy (Skenderija)

2:00 PM - Folk Music and Dances /Folk Groups from various Napredak branches.

October 4

6:00 PM - Solemn Holy Mass (Cathedral)

7:00 PM - Concert (Cathedral)

Soccer game - “Napredak” vs Sarajevo

“Zeljeznicar” (date to be set)

Congratulations to Napredak, its leadership, its chapters around the world, and its members on the occasion of this great jubilee from the Association for Croatian Studies!

A SHORT HISTORY OF NAPREDAK

Napredak (Progress) is the oldest existing Croatian cultural and benevolent society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It evolved out of two organizations with similar goals. The first was formed in Mostar in September 1902 and the second in Sarajevo shortly after. The two groups merged in 1907 into a single vibrant and dedicated association that has had a major impact on the Croatian cultural presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia.

The main mission of Napredak has been to help needy young Croatians to finish vocational, intermediate, and university studies, and to foster higher spiritual and cultural life among the Croatians, especially the young.

Between 1907 and 1914, Napredak granted scholarships to 165 university students; provided tuition for 325 high school pupils; gave financial help to 308 other needy high school students; placed and supported 509 young people in various vocational schools. Furthermore, it provided room and board for another 241 students in its own boarding house in Sarajevo.

From 1902 to 1928, Napredak made it possible for 6,300 students to finish their secondary or university education. Among the recipients of Napredak scholarship were two Nobel prize winners: Ivo Andric and Vladimir

Prelog.

In 1935, Napredak had 151 chapters and 44 committees with a total of over twenty thousand members.

Napredak published numerous books and periodicals, had a large library, numerous choirs, brass bands, and amateur theaters. It established its own bank and an insurance company, and erected beautiful buildings in Sarajevo, Mostar, Zagreb, Tuzla, Zenica, Bugojno, Travnik, Vitez, Siroki Brijeg, and Brcko that served as oases of Croatian cultural life.

In 1949, the organization was banned, its property was confiscated, and many of its members were persecuted, jailed, and even executed.

In 1990, Napredak was revived and, by means of the written word, humanitarian aid, support of students, and its cultural activities, it became a voice of peace and a light that shined in the wilderness of destruction and hate during the 1992-1995 war in B-H.

Today, Napredak has over 20,000 members organized in over 60 chapters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and other countries.

Napredak organizes various scholarly, cultural, and sport activities. However, its main mission, to support needy student in their pursuit of education, is at the forefront of its endeavors. In the 2001/2002 academic year, Napredak gave scholarships (c. \$100.00 per month) to 165 students at various universities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

Napredak has a long and noble tradition in helping talented and needy students to achieve their life-ambitions through education. Anyone interested in joining and/or supporting Napredak in its educational and cultural activities contact:

Napredak

M. Tita 56

Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Tel. 387-33-472-349

Fax 387-33-447-223

E-Mail: trebevic@bih.net.baIn the US, Napredak chapters exist in New York, Chicago, and Detroit. There are also Napredak chapters in Canada. For more information on Napredak in the USA, contact Ante Cuvalo (Chicago), Josip Knezevic (New York), Miro Komsic (Detroit).

In

VIEWS FROM INSIDE: MEMOIRS CONCERNING THE YUGOSLAV BREAKUP AND WAR

Sabrina P. Ramet

Der Jugoslawien-Krieg: Meine Wahrheit. By Janez Drnovsek

Trans. from Slovenian by Doris Debeniak. Kilchberg, Switz.: Smartbooks, 1998. 359 pp. Index. Photographs. Map.

Lukava strategija. By Sefer Halilovic. 3d exp. ed. Sarajevo: Matica, 1998. 307 pp. Appendixes.

The Making of the Slovenian State, 1988-1992: The Collapse of

Yugoslavia. By Janez Jansa. Trans. AMIDAS d.o.o. Ed. Aleksandar Zorn. Ljubljana: Založba Mladinska knjiga, 1994. 251 pp. Figures. Photographs. Map.

Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije: Svjedocenja. By Raif

Dizdarevic. Sarajevo: Svjedok, 1999. 459 pp. Index. Photographs.

Rat koji nismo htjeli: Hrvatska 1991. By Davorin Rudolf. Zagreb:

Nakladni zavod Globus, 1999. 411 pp. Bibliography. Index. Photographs.

Sjecanja: Autobiografski zapis. By Alija Izetbegovic. Sarajevo:

TKD Sahinbasic, 2001. 503 pp. Appendixes. Index. Photographs.

Sjecanja vojnika. By Martin Spegelj. Ed. Ivo Zanic. Zagreb:

Znanje, 2001. xxiii, 430 pp. Appendixes. Index. Photographs. Maps.

Slučaj Jugoslavija. By Branko Mamula. Podgorica: CID, 2000. 339

pp. Map

The Struggle for the Croatian State ... through Hell to Democracy.

By Zdravko Tomac, Trans. Profikon. Zagreb: Profikon, 1993. 568 pp. Figures.

Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Milosevicem 1993-95 (98).

By Hrvoje Sarinic. Zagreb: Globus, 1999. 343 pp. Index. Photographs.

I am grateful to Branka Magas and Diane Koenker for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

o scholar, as far as I am aware, has ever supported the fanciful “ancient hatreds” thesis in any form. But the scholarly literature concerning recent Yugoslav history has not been without its serious lapses—among them, inexplicable tendencies toward occasional Germanophobia, Hobbist tendencies toward the elevation of state sovereignty above the moral law (flaring during discussions of possible western duty to intervene in Bosnia during 1992-95 and in Kosovo in 1998-99), and moral relativism.(1) Inevitably, these tendencies have affected the way facts have been presented.

Thus, the recent flood of memoirs from principals in the Yugoslav drama is especially welcome, for it affords us the opportunity to see how the participants themselves would like their roles and actions to be remembered and provides fresh accounts from the inside concerning what may have happened. In the process, readers may test their own theories and interpretations concerning the breakup and the war against first-hand recollections.

Among the first memoirs published were those by Stipe Mesic, former president of the Presidency of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) from May to October 1991; Veljko Kadijevic, former SFRY defense minister from May 1988 to January 1992; and Borisav Jovic, former president of the Presidency of the SFRY from May 1990 to May 1991.(2) Jovic’s memoirs, in particular, which take the form of a diary, provide insights into the day-to-day conversations and decision making at the highest levels in Belgrade during the crucial final years of socialist Yugoslavia and have created an enormous stir—both in Serbia and abroad. The volumes presently under review include three memoirs by former defense ministers (Branko Mamula of the SFRY, Janez Jansa of Slovenia, and Martin Spegelj of Croatia), two memoirs by former presidents of the SFRY Presidency (Raif Dizdarevic and Janez Drnovsek), four memoirs by others holding high political office (Alija Izetbegovic, Zdravko Tomac, Hrvoje Sarinic, and Davorin Rudolf), and one by the chief of staff of the Bosnian army (Sefer Halilovic). Several of these reprint the transcripts of critical sessions and include documents and speeches. Jovic’s memoirs are cited or mentioned by several of these authors; indeed, the memoirs by Mamula and Rudolf have a rather hybrid character, mixing the memoir genre with aspects of scholarly research—the inclusion of an extensive bibliography in Rudolf’s volume is merely the most obvious reflection of this character. Most of the ten memoirs under review here are compatible with the way in which most scholars understand the events of the past decade. Two of them—those by Admiral Mamula and General Halilovic—are frankly revisionist and will be

enjoyed by those who have suspected, for whatever reason, that the real facts have been withheld from the public and that the “real story” must be different from what has been generally reported.

Although I shall focus on what these sundry memoirs tell us about internal developments, several of them—those by Dizdarevic, Drnovsek, Izetbegovic, Sarinic, and Tomac—also offer reflections on the role and reactions (or failures to react) of the international community. Those by Halilovic, Jansa, Spegelj and Tomac enter into debates about military strategy, with Spegelj and Tomac taking opposite points of view concerning Croatia’s best strategy in 1991. Several of them, most particularly those by Dizdarevic, Drnovsek, Jansa, Mamula, and Tomac, offer some insights into deliberations at the highest levels of party or government.

I have organized my discussion temporally, with sections on the roots of the crisis (where the memoirs of Dizdarevic, Rudolf, and Mamula are discussed), the war in Slovenia (with a discussion of the memoirs by Drnovsek, Jansa, and, in brief, Dizdarevic again), the war in Croatia (focusing on the opposing accounts offered by Tomac and Spegelj), and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (with a discussion of the memoirs by Izetbegovic, Halilovic, and Sarinic. In the conclusion, I offer my views about the best literature to consult concerning Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav affairs during the period since 1980.

Roots of the Crisis (Dizdarevic, Rudolf, Mamula)

In tracing the roots of the crisis, it is wise to avoid uncausal or virtually uncausal explanations, such as that economic deterioration alone or constitutional revisions alone are responsible for the violent breakup of socialist Yugoslavia. Moreover, accounts that take as their point of departure the country’s multiethnic and multiconfessional makeup cannot but end in foolishness and vapid error. Neither the Scots nor the Welsh have taken up arms against the British government in recent centuries. Nor have the Corsicans against Paris, Spanish-speakers in the United States, or the Quebecois in Canada. What distinguished socialist Yugoslavia from these other cases was its lack of legitimate government, and this is the factor that should be given prominence. Legitimate governments can weather an economic crisis, but for illegitimate governments, sustained economic crisis can be deadly. That proved to be the case in Yugoslavia. But even there, it was necessary for persons to appear who were prepared to translate economic frustration into ethnic hatred and who could, operating within the framework of an illegitimate system, subvert political processes for their own purposes. In this translation, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic and his collaborators Jovic, Miroslav Solevic, and others; the Serbian press; the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art (Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti, SANU); and the Serbian Orthodox Church played the initiating role in the years 1987-90, at a time when the communist leadership in Croatia was desperately trying to put out the flames of nationalism being lit by Croatian Serbs under Belgrade’s influence. The leading figures in the Serbian Orthodox Church not only contributed to stirring up Serbian anger against Croats for past wrongs, by dwelling one-sidedly on the horrors of Croatian fascism during World War II at a time when emotions in Yugoslavia were becoming increasingly raw, but allegedly favored the creation of a Greater Serbian state to which certain areas of Croatia where Serbs lived would be attached.(3)

Only in April 1990, three and a half years after the Belgrade daily newspaper *Vecernje novosti* startled the country by publishing extracts of the self-pitying nationalist tract known simply as “the Memorandum,” which had been drawn up by SANU, and two and a half years after Milosevic had come to power in Serbia, was retired General Franjo Tudjman, who had earned a doctorate in history at the Zadar campus of the University of Zagreb and who had campaigned on a nationalist platform, elected president of Croatia. It is plausible to argue that Tudjman might never have been elected president of Croatia but for Milosevic and the tidal wave of Serbian nationalism already moving across Yugoslavia. But, as it was, Tudjman’s election moved the SFRY one step closer to breakup. Milosevic began arming Serbs in Croatia during the summer of 1990, but in March 1991, he met with Tudjman at Karadjordjevo to discuss the partition of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.

Raif Dizdarevic served as president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1978 to 1982, president of the federal Assembly in 1982 - 83, foreign minister from 1984 to 1988, and president of the SFRY Presidency in 1988 - 89. His memoirs cover the decade, described by these terms of office and thus offer greater historical perspective than the other memoirs under review here. Dizdarevic begins his account with descriptions of conversations among the elite at the time of Josip Broz Tito’s decline and eventual death. At that time (after December 1979), Dizdarevic says, the Yugoslav leadership feared that the Warsaw Pact might take advantage of Tito’s incapacitation to hurl as many as 15 to 20 divisions, including tanks and aircraft, against Yugoslavia, in an effort to snuff out Yugoslavia’s “third way,” and devoted special attention to preparing the territorial defense forces for possible defense against Soviet bloc invasion.(4) The Yugoslav leadership also obtained information at the time that anti-Tito émigré organizations were allegedly in touch with Soviet intelligence services and were planning to carry out various subversive and terrorist actions upon Tito’s death.(5) Dizdarevic devotes part of his account to discussing the troubles afflicting Kosovo over the decade and identifies the anti-Belgrade demonstrations of April 1981 as marking the inception of the crisis of Yugoslav survival. Later that year, the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia held a marathon session on 24-26 December devoted to interethnic relations within the republic. This session also saw vociferous complaints that the existence of the two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) damaged the constitutional unity of Serbia, with some of those claiming that Serbia was not receiving equal treatment with the other constituent republics of the SFRY. Strikingly, at the same session, Draza Markovic, one of the leading figures in Serbian politics at the time, said that Yugoslavia consisted of five peoples (*narod*), naming the Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes; under the formula used at the time, Markovic should also have mentioned the Muslims (Bosniaks), who had been officially recognized as a *narod* in 1968. Dizdarevic does not think that this omission was accidental, however.(6) Given the implied threats to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, this session inevitably sent shock waves through the country.

Dizdarevic recounts the economic deterioration during the 1980s (with the purchasing power of citizens falling 30 - 40 percent in 1987 alone).(7) But, as Dizdarevic notes, the federal organs were paralyzed. In Dizdarevic’s view, Slobodan Milosevic’s accession to power in Serbia toward the end of the 1980’s was decisive in taking Yugoslavia down the road to war. He characterizes Milosevic as unscrupulous, mendacious, and shameless in his use of mobs to destabilize the legal institutions of the country. Indeed, Dizdarevic maintains that he had evidence already at that time

that Solevic's committee, which organized mass disturbances in Novi Sad, Titograd (Podgorica), and Pristina in 1988 - 89 in order to remove independent-minded local leaders from power, was acting on Milosevic's orders.(8) But what is so striking in Dizdarevic's account is the complete impotence of the SFRY Presidency in the face of Milosevic's defiance. The SFRY Presidency repeatedly met to discuss these disturbances. On 14 September 1988, for example, an expanded session of the Presidency concluded that Yugoslavia's very survival was being threatened by the growth of organized nationalist activity (organized by Solevic and others) and, in particular, by the confrontation between the leaders in Serbia and in the provinces. This session also criticized the organization of Serb nationalist "meetings," which the Presidency saw as highly destabilizing.(9)

One reads of Dizdarevic's nervous phone calls to the embattled Nandor Major of Vojvodina, of his desperate conversations with Interior Minister Petar Gracanin and with Serbian leader Milosevic, of Slovenian leader Milan Kucan's refusal to condone the proclamation of a state of emergency after Milosevic's overthrow of the elected leadership in Vojvodina (evidently because he feared that the army could then use the state of emergency to clean up perceived "troubles" in Slovenia), and of Dusan Ckrebic's brash defense of the antigovernment rally in Novi Sad in October 1988, on the grounds that there had been no "excesses."(10) When the disturbances spread to Titograd, the capital of Montenegro, on 7-8 October 1988, the SFRY Presidency took note of the fact that the most militant demonstrators in Titograd were not locals at all, but had come from Serbia! But when the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia called Milosevic to account, since the party echelons had sufficient evidence to implicate him in these events, he behaved as if nothing of consequence had transpired in Montenegro and insisted that he was in no way involved in the events in Titograd. (11) Three months later, renewed disturbances succeeded in removing the Montenegrin leadership from power. Again, Dizdarevic emphasizes the "powerlessness" of the SFRY Presidency upon finding that, after two days of protests, not a single organ of government or party in Montenegro was capable of undertaking effective countermeasures.

In his account, Dizdarevic presents himself as an honest and courageous, if largely impotent, adversary of Milosevic, who saw that Serbian nationalism and chauvinism held the greatest danger for the country. To Dizdarevic's mind, Slovenian and Croatian separatism developed, in the first place, as a reaction to the lawlessness spreading from Belgrade and were propelled forward by the overthrow of the Montenegrin leadership in January 1989.(12) He insists that, under the law, there was nothing more that the SFRY Presidency could have done to pull the country back from the brink, since it did not have the authority to remove Milosevic from office.(13) Although Milosevic emerges as the "sorcerer" in Dizdarevic's account, the author emphasizes the "betrayal" of the army and Kadijevic's personal responsibility for the final breakup of Yugoslavia; without the defection of the army, Milosevic could not have unleashed his aggression against non-Serbs.(14) Dizdarevic has some sympathies for a nonfederal constitution but insists that democratization, not a change in federal relations, was the real issue, and that only democratization could have taken Yugoslavia down a safer path.(15) Dizdarevic's self-representation might be just a bit self-serving. Viktor Meier, for example, characterizes Dizdarevic as opportunistic and timid, notes his support for Milosevic's suppression of provincial autonomy, and says that the "predominantly reactionary state presidency proved, under Dizdarevic's leadership, to be little more than Milosevic's executive assistant"—quite a

different picture from that sketched by Dizdarevic.(16) What may be said in defense of Dizdarevic-the-author is that he has, belatedly, gotten important parts of the story right.

If Milosevic was the “sorcerer,” then Borisav Jovic, the Serbian representative on the SFRY Presidency, was “the sorcerer’s apprentice”—loyal to his master, but creating difficulties faster than he could resolve them himself. This is the view of Davorin Rudolf, who served as minister of maritime affairs in the Republic of Croatia from 1990 to 1992 and as Croatian foreign minister for a few months in mid-1991. But ultimately, in Rudolf’s view, the problems antedated Milosevic’s arrival on the scene. Rudolf identifies Serbia as the problem (and hence, not just Milosevic), tracing the roots of the war to the Nacertanije of Ilija Garsanin (drafted in 1844, first revealed in 1902), the irredentist notions of nineteenth-century Serb writers Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic and Vladimir Karic (the latter of whom published a map in 1887, showing Croatia, including Slavonia, Istria, and Dalmatia, as well as Backa, Banat, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as “lands inhabited solely by Serbs”), (17) historian Mihailo Jovic (whose 1822 Srpska istorija claimed that only Serbs lived in Dubrovnik), Serbian chauvinism in the interwar kingdom (1919-41), the Chetnik movement, lingering Serbian nationalist pretensions in socialist Yugoslavia, and the infamous SANU memorandum of 1986.

As a result of occupying a relatively minor post as minister for maritime affairs (except for the very brief stint as foreign minister), Rudolf was not party to some of the key decisions. This is perhaps why his account is derived, to a considerable extent, from other memoirs and treatments. Rudolf nonetheless formed some negative views about the level of understanding of the Yugoslav crisis in European and American policy circles, and he shares these with the reader.

Although Rudolf admits that there were strong differences of opinion within the Croatian political establishment after the spring 1990 elections, he insists that moderates defined the mainstream of government opinion. Indeed, one of the central themes of his book is that, alongside such radicals as Gojko Susak (who, according to Laura Silber and Allan Little, actually fanned the flames of war)(18) and “hotheads” such as General Martin Spigelj, there were also moderates in the government who wanted desperately to prevent war from breaking out—and hence, the book’s title *Rat koji nismo htjeli* (The war we did not want). This theme may strike some readers as beside the point or as not worth belaboring, but it is nonetheless Rudolf’s concern. Rudolf’s characterization of Spigelj is, however, misleading and probably reflects Rudolf’s limited role, more than anything else. Indeed, although the war in Croatia is Rudolf’s primary concern, Rudolf’s quasi-memoirs add essentially nothing to our understanding of this war.

Branko Mamula served as chief of the General Staff from June 1979 to May 1982 and as federal minister for people’s defense from May 1982 to May 1988. He begins his account in December 1979, as Tito was hospitalized, and carries it forward to the outbreak of war in 1991. Mamula reveals that in early 1980,

the Italians expected that Yugoslavia would fall apart after Tito and that the Russians would take the largest portion [of the country's territory], and in that event they wanted to maintain their right to “zone B.”

Somewhere around that time [Soviet Foreign Minister] Gromyko made a visit to Italy, and according to the information we received, it appears that the Italians would not oppose a Russian occupation of part of Yugoslavia, on the condition that Italy's right to "zone B" would be recognized.... Inside Yugoslavia a special war against Italy was being planned—involving sabotage, information-warfare, and aerial and marine landing units.(19)

At the time, there were telling troop movements into Hungary and Bulgaria, as well as military exercises by Soviet bloc troops in the vicinity of Yugoslavia's borders. But in June 1980, Soviet leaders advised Mitja Ribicic, at that time chair of the Federal Executive Council, that there would be no intervention unless socialism in Yugoslavia were to be threatened.(20) That reassurance notwithstanding, developments on the ground were troubling to the authorities in Belgrade. In Hungary, for example, the four Soviet divisions already in place were reinforced during 1980 by two more Soviet divisions (in addition to a division transferred south from Slovakia), while in Bulgaria, the military exercises in 1980 were on a much grander scale than anything seen in previous years.(21)

Mamula, who was displeased that the army's warnings of dangers in the post-Tito era had been ignored within the party echelons in December 1979, felt that the Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav People's Army, JNA) had a legitimate political role to play in Yugoslavia and, upon becoming minister of defense on 15 May 1982, began to act on that conviction. Mamula claims that he was also suspicious about the territorial defense system established in 1968, under which the republics controlled territorial defense forces and weaponry. In 1983, fully seven years before the JNA would confiscate weapons from the territorial defense forces in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the army drew up a balance sheet on the lessons learned from Croatia in 1971 and Kosovo in 1981, according to Mamula, and concluded that similar situations could recur in the future. Since units of the territorial defense forces could be called to action by the republic governments under the legal provisions of the time, they could conceivably be employed against the common state. Therefore, according to Mamula, the JNA concluded, that it would be best to relieve the republic leaderships of their authority within the territorial defense system.(22) General Spigelj offers partial confirmation of Mamula's account, although Spigelj says that the "secret mechanisms" designed to eliminate republican autonomy in defense were put in place in 1984, rather than in 1983.(23) On the other hand, the historical record does not support Mamula's claim that the implementation of this plan in 1990 was neutral. Had Mamula been primarily motivated by the concern to preserve Yugoslavia in 1988, he would have prioritized resolving the problems already being stirred up by Milosevic and his flunkies in Serbia rather than obtaining revenge against the Slovenes for the irritations he experienced in reading *Mladina*, the liberal, risk-taking Slovenian weekly magazine published, at that time, by the League of Youth of Slovenia.

According to Mamula, the army realized in the late 1980s that socialism was breaking down, giving way to democratic pluralism and a market economy, but was worried that this could lead to interethnic fighting along the lines of what had occurred during World War II. Mamula argues that, at least in the period during which he was minister of defense, there was no consensus within the army to support a centralized Yugoslavia under Serbian hegemony. (24) In Mamula's view, the JNA was deeply disconcerted about Milosevic's putsch in 1987 but did not see a way to counter it.(25) This contention strains the reader's credulity. At the same time, Mamula admits

that some retired generals supported Milosevic—especially those who felt they had been passed over for important appointments.(26)

It is in turning to Slovenia that Mamula's account becomes overtly revisionist. He claims, for example, that the Slovenian party and state leadership had already decided, in the second half of 1984, at one of its closed sessions, to organize a campaign against the JNA, adding that Kucan and other Slovenian leaders "prepared the game with Jansa and the others over the theft of the confidential document" in order to present this as related to a purported army plot against Slovenia.(27) Given that Kucan did not become chief of the League of Communists of Slovenia until 1986 and that the theft in question occurred in 1988, it is hard to imagine that an entirely different leadership, more conservative than the Kucan leadership, had planned all of this four years in advance. Furthermore, in a version that diverges from the standard account,(28) Mamula denies that the JNA was preparing some sort of military strike against Slovenia in early 1988 or intending to arrest Slovenia's political leaders and leading dissidents; he says that in giving this account of the army's intentions in conversation with Slovenian Minister of Internal Affairs Tomaz Ertl, General Svetozar Visnjic, commander of the army district in Ljubljana, misunderstood the situation and misrepresented the discussions held in the Military Council. (29) Finally, Mamula divides the blame for the destruction of Yugoslavia equally between Slovenia and Serbia but fails to address the Slovenian argument, developed at some length in Drnovsek's account, that all the key decisions taken by Slovenia—asserting the sovereignty of the republic, proposing a confederal reorganization of the country as a whole, and finally, preparing for independence—were undertaken in response to the growing lawlessness displayed by Serbian authorities. (30)

War in Slovenia (Drnovsek, Jansa, Dizdarevic)

In preparing for war, Milosevic, Jovic, and Kadijevic wanted Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina disarmed. This is why, in spring 1990, the army was ordered to seize the arms of the territorial defense forces in those three republics and remove them to secure sites. The point was to disarm the local authorities in those republics at the same time as Serbian paramilitary groups in Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina were receiving arms from JNA warehouses and training from JNA instructors. Frightened by this completely illegal move and feeling increasingly threatened by both the rhetoric in Belgrade and the various other unconstitutional and illegal moves being taken by Belgrade or with Belgrade's approval, Slovenia and Croatia turned to foreign sources to replace the arms that had been confiscated and to build up armed forces capable of defending their respective republics from the expected showdown with Serbian forces.(31) In October 1990, Slovenia and Croatia had presented a joint proposal for transforming the SFRY into a confederation, a proposal the leaderships of both republics viewed as the last chance to preserve Yugoslavia in any form within its given boundaries. Even if the proposal had been adopted, it is unlikely to have worked. After all, if illegitimate government is the problem, then the solution is to create legitimate government, not to create autonomous spheres in which certain actors can allow themselves to imagine that they are "safe" from the problems next door. On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their "disassociation" from the SFRY; a ten-day war between the JNA and the fledgling but determined armed forces of Slovenia ended when European Union (EU) mediators asked Slovenia to accept a three-month

moratorium on the “activation” of its independence. By now the federal government was well on the way to complete collapse; Milosevic, the ambitious Serbian leader, had no interest in pursuing war in Slovenia, however, and by October 1991, Slovenian independence was a fact—though a fact not recognized by the EU until two months later. The JNA took its time giving up its barracks in Slovenia, however, with the last JNA troops leaving Slovenia only on 26 October 1991.

It is possible to read Drnovsek’s and Jansa’s accounts as two parts of the same puzzle, but in fact their outlooks are totally different, even, in some ways, incompatible. Janez Drnovsek, who served as president of the SFRY Presidency from May 1989 to May 1990 and who has been prime minister of Slovenia for most of the time since mid-April 1992, portrays Slovenia as largely united in its political posture and represents his own actions as a member of the SFRY Presidency as astutely attuned to producing the best possible results for Slovenia; Janez Jansa, who served as minister of defense of Slovenia from 1990 to 1994 and again for a few months in 2000, stresses the differences of opinion within Slovenia at the time an independent course was being charted. Jansa, for example, characterizes Jozef Skolc, the first president of the Slovenian Liberal Democratic Party (LDS), as an “opponent of the formation of Slovenia’s own defense system” (32) and repeatedly castigates members of the LDS (Drnovsek’s party) for their lack of enthusiasm for and faith in the cause of Slovenian independence. Jansa also claims that the Slovenian government (which is to say, Milan Kucan, among others) consented in advance to his own arrest, together with the others put on trial in 1988, thus offering a version of events utterly divergent from Kucan’s account of the same events, as related by Viktor Meier, the renowned journalist for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*.(33) Jansa gives credit to local municipalities, ultimately, for holding onto about 30 percent of the arms allocated to the territorial defense forces in May 1990, as the JNA was trying to confiscate all territorial defense weaponry not only in Slovenia but also in Croatia and Bosnia. Later, when the JNA kidnapped Vladimir Milosevic, commander of the Slovenian territorial defense regional headquarters, Jansa cut off electricity and telephone service to the key barracks until the army finally relented and released Milosevic. But, as Jansa recalls, “Drnovsek was a master in political appearances and ... he knew how to take advantage of his position for his own promotion excellently. His short discussion with Kadijevic and his half-hour appearance on TV [were] enough to convince a large part of the public that it was he [and not Jansa] who had saved the situation and achieved the release of Milosevic.”(34) When Jansa further criticizes Drnovsek for his endorsement of the eleventh-hour Gligorov-Izetbegovic plan for a reorganized Yugoslav state—a plan supported by the European Community—on the grounds that this was incompatible with the results of the Slovenian referendum on independence, one comes to appreciate that there were (and are still) fundamental political differences between the two men.(35)

In Drnovsek’s account there is not a hint of the possibility that anyone in the Slovenian government was implicated in the arrest of Jansa and the others; on the contrary, Drnovsek’s account leads one to believe that the arrests and trial in 1988 had the character of a duel between the JNA and the Republic of Slovenia. Moreover, where Jansa found a number of mugwumps, who doubted the capacity of the small Slovenian armed force to repel the JNA and who therefore preferred to straddle the fence on the issue of independence, in Drnovsek’s account the choice for independence is presented as the overwhelming preference of Slovenes by the end of 1990

and as the natural response to the growing lawlessness in Serbia and threats to the political order in Slovenia.(36)

Drnovsek presents himself unabashedly as a hero in his own time, as a kind of “Lone Ranger” plucked from nowhere (“It was as if someone had sent me to Mars,” Drnovsek says) to run for the presidency, not beholden to the party or to anyone else, as a relentless fighter for human rights, whether in Kosovo or elsewhere, and a resolute defender of Slovenia’s interests at the level of the federation.(37)

Raif Dizdarevic’s *Od smrti Tita* also has some things to say about events in Slovenia in 1988 and, interestingly enough, offers an account that is distinct from Mamula’s, Jansa’s or Kucan’s. According to Dizdarevic, General Visnjic’s visit to Minister Ertl in May 1988 was completely “routine” and was limited to discussing ways to strengthen the security at military installations on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia.(38) Given the various representations being made in late May by Kucan, Ertl, Kadijevic, and others, the party Central Committee inevitably discussed the charges being made by Kucan. During a break in the session, Dizdarevic talked with General Visnjic who allegedly, with tears in his eyes, denied that he had in any way exceeded his mandate in the conversation with Ertl, Kucan, and Stane Dolanc, or presented anything that could have been construed as threatening to the Slovenian leadership.

War in Croatia (Tomic versus Spegelj)

Serb-Croat clashes at Pakrac and Plitvice in February 1991 and in Borovo selo in May 1991 left no doubt about the gravity of the situation, but the war in Croatia began in earnest only with the occupation of Baranja on 3 July by JNA troops together with Serb volunteers and paramilitary forces. Croatian Defense Minister Spegelj urged that Croatian forces place JNA barracks under siege, but this was not done until September, by which point about 30 percent of Croatian territory was controlled by Serb paramilitary forces. At the end of the year a truce was drawn up, under the provisions of which United Nations Protection Force troops were brought into Croatia to create a buffer zone between the Republic of Croatia and the separatist-minded Serbian frontier zones (“Krajine” in Serbian).

Zdravko Tomic, a political science professor for many years and a member of the Socijaldemokratska partija (Social Democratic Party), served as deputy prime minister in the Government of Democratic Unity in Zagreb from August 1991 to June 1992. His memoirs are largely confined to the period during which he served in this post. His purpose in writing this book was, apparently, to justify Croatia’s policies, to underline the broad base of support Tudjman enjoyed during the Government of Democratic Unity, and to offer an only slightly qualified defense of Croatian President Tudjman. Indeed, Tudjman looms large in this book, and he is given a mainly positive presentation; Tomic’s harshest criticism of Tudjman is that it would have been better for Croatia to have avoided conflict with the Muslims (Bosniaks) and to have formed a military alliance with the Izetbegovic government against the Serbs.(39) (This was later done, as is well known, after the publication of Tomic’s book.) Elsewhere, Tomic expresses his disappointment with Tudjman’s alleged “lenience and hasty consent to certain agreements, sometimes even without consultation with the Government.” (40) On the other hand,

Tomac excuses certain “concessions” Tudjman made to the extreme right as necessary to maintain unity at a time of crisis.(41) Tomac endeavors to highlight moderate and liberal currents within the Zagreb government of the time and to paint Tudjman himself as a moderate. Thus, he reports that he and other members of the government were shocked by the accord reached between Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in May 1992,(42) even though Tudjman favored the accord, and he highlights his own personal engagement to chasten recruits who expressed disdain for the Serbs.

Tomac also disparages rumors circulating at the time (during summer 1991) to the effect that Zagreb was deliberately refusing to send ammunition or medicines to the defenders of Vukovar, allegedly in the belief that the fall of Vukovar would prove useful in marshalling international support for Croatia’s cause. Tomac claims that the Croatian government had medicines and ammunition flown into Vukovar by night, authorizing several attempts by Croatian forces to break through to Vukovar (43) and that he and other ministers were always available to talk by phone with those trapped in Vukovar. Tomac does not mention, however, that as of 13 October, the Croatian army stood in position to sweep into Vukovar and relieve the siege but that the operation was stopped by the forceful intervention of President Tudjman personally; Tudjman, for his part, said that he was being pressured by the European Community not to mount a counterattack, since Doctors without Borders allegedly wanted to send a humanitarian convoy to the besieged city.(44) In other words, in military terms, Vukovar’s situation was not as hopeless as Tomac paints it.

But the most potent controversy of 1991, which divided the Croatian political establishment down the middle, was the debate concerning the JNA barracks. Radicals, led by Defense Minister Spegelj, wanted to lay siege to the barracks sooner rather than later; in their view, the arms kept at the barracks were the solution to Croatia’s weapons’ shortage. Tomac was one of the more vocal advocates of the more dilatory strategy that ultimately prevailed. Tomac claims that Spegelj’s preferred strategy would have been “dangerous and possibly catastrophic.”(45) Spegelj would have liked to see the JNA barracks placed under siege as early as January 1991 or, at the latest, in June of that year. Spegelj pressed his argument with such force that Tudjman, who was either not convinced by Spegelj’s logic (as Tomac argues) or intent on prolonging the war in order to bring about the partition of Bosnia upon which he and Milosevic had agreed (as Spegelj argues), dismissed the general as minister of defense on 15 June 1991, appointing Sime Djodan as his successor.(46) Only at the beginning of September 1991 did Croatian authorities initiate simultaneously a siege of all JNA barracks in the republic—belatedly adopting Spegelj’s strategy but under circumstances arguably less favorable than when Spegelj had first urged the strategy—cutting off their water, power, telephone, and food supplies and blocking all access points. Croatia’s strategy was to combine old-fashioned siege tactics with negotiation. Indeed, Tomac insists that the JNA barracks were so well fortified and armed that in most cases it would have been out of the question to have attempted a frontal assault, though this is beside the point, since no one seriously advocated this.(47) But Croatian forces did score a coup by capturing the Delnice barracks and negotiating the departure of the JNA forces from Rijeka and Istria. Yet according to Generals Tus and Spegelj, the JNA had been broken by the end of 1991 and the introduction of “peacekeeping forces” only served to delay Croatia’s eventual reconquest of its own territory.(48)

Tomac reveals some interesting details concerning the Croatian leadership's appeal to then-President Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1991 and the Soviet leader's intervention with Belgrade to pressure the Serbs to back off somewhat. Tomac also recounts how on 5 October 1991, the Croatian government received a note from Serbian Prime Minister Dragutin Zelenovic alleging that Croatian (!) forces were destroying Dubrovnik and pledging that the Yugoslav army would "spare no effort to protect this historical city." (49) The Serbs also accused the Croatian government of firing on Tudjman's presidential palace in order to blame it on the Serbs and "even charged President Tudjman [with] trying to kill himself in order to spite Serbia." (50)

Spegelj's volume, published exactly ten years after he resigned as minister of defense, became an overnight bestseller in Croatia and went into a second printing within a month. Still controversial even a decade later, Spegelj's argument remains the same: that it would have been better for Croatia if the barracks had been captured before or at the onset of the escalation of hostilities. Spegelj links this argument to his further contention that Croatian defense needs would have been better served by closer coordination with the Slovenes and by taking the initiative in launching synchronized attacks on JNA facilities across Slovenia and Croatia. In this way, Spegelj argues, the JNA would have been denied the initiative and would have had to deal with two foes at once, on terms not of its own choosing. (51) He argues further that Zagreb could have reckoned that it would take at least two months from the outbreak of hostilities for Belgrade to mobilize its forces, and that therefore Zagreb would have been better served by attacking the barracks sooner. (52) (Konrad Kolsek, the commander of the Fifth Military District, who was relieved of duty several days after hostilities broke out in Slovenia, disputes Spegelj's account, however, arguing that Croatia had insufficient troops and insufficient weapons and could not afford to take on the might of the JNA at that time, but Spegelj himself says that the JNA suffered from a shortage of available recruits and was fundamentally weak. (53))

Spegelj notes that at the end of July 1991, as Croatia was sliding into war on the JNA's terms, President Tudjman was relaxing with tennis, and the atmosphere around him was "as if there had been 1,000 years of peace." (54) He also recounts his arguments with Tudjman, revealing that Tudjman was ignorant of the most basic facts concerning Croatian military strength, casualties, and so forth. He recalls that his first elaborated defense plan, presented to the Croatian government on 27 December 1990, was discussed for six hours and then put on the back burner, allegedly on the supposition that Croatia did not need to worry about a defense plan. (55) Spegelj was clearly convinced in early 1991 that striking at the JNA early and hard would be Croatia's best defense, and he presented this plan not only to Tudjman but also to Prime Minister Manolic (in July 1991), among others. (56) According to Spegelj, "the conditions for a complete defeat of the aggressor had been created and there exist very strong military arguments that this could have been accomplished by the second half of 1992 at the latest (to include not only Croatia but also the defense and complete liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, naturally in agreement with its legal leadership [i.e., the Izetbegovic government] and in alliance with its legal defense forces. (57) Of course, if Spegelj's analysis is correct, then the late President Tudjman is guilty of gross negligence at a minimum, or, if his decisions were conditioned by his March 1991 agreement with Milosevic at Karadjordjevo, even of treason. It is no wonder that this book has met with lively discussion in Croatia and elsewhere.

War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Izetbegovic, Halilovic, Sarinic)

By July 1991, the Serbian arms transfusion to Serb militias in Bosnia was underway.(58) In August 1991, Milosevic met with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to discuss their strategy for Bosnia; that strategy was to use military force to annex a large portion of Bosnia to Serbia, expelling or killing non-Serbs who happened to be living in those parts coveted by the Serbian leaders. The following month, the Yugoslav army established the Serbian Autonomous Region of Herzegovina, securing its borders; additional Serbian autonomous zones were established at this time also in Bosanska Krajina (northwestern Bosnia around Banja Luka) and in Romanija (east of Sarajevo). These regions immediately requested Yugoslav army “assistance.”(59) Before the end of 1991, Serb authorities also undertook to have some arms production facilities in Bosnia dismantled and transferred to Serbia. By December of that year, moreover, heavy weaponry was “being brought into position around the cities of Sarajevo, Mostar, Bihac, and Tuzla, so that these cities could be bombarded at any time.”(60) Taken together, these moves suggest that there was nothing Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic could have done, short of abject supplication before Milosevic, to avert the outbreak of hostilities. A report of the Second Army District on 20 March 1992 revealed that the JNA had already distributed some 51,900 light weapons to the Serbs in Bosnia by then; in addition, Karadzic’s Serbian Democratic Party had procured an additional 17,300 rifles through other channels.(61) Croatian-Bosniak collaboration might have broken the back of the JNA-backed Serbian insurrection at an early stage. But Tudjman dreamt of annexing large sections of Bosnia and authorized illegal Croatian military formations operating in Bosnia to attack the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to take control of key towns, establishing a Croatian para-state under the name “Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.”(62)

Clashes between Serbs and non-Serbs in Bosnia actually began in August 1991,(63) but it was not until the following April that the Serbian assault on Bosnia-Herzegovina began in earnest. By October 1992, if not before, the Croatian army was engaging in collaborative behavior with Serbian forces—for example, pulling out of Bosanski Brod in order to allow Serb forces to capture the town.(64) The war eventually became a four-sided conflict, with Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian forces loyal to the elected government of Alija Izetbegovic, and forces loyal to Fikret Abdic, self-declared head of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, variously fighting or collaborating with each other. By the end of the fighting, in November 1995, some 215,000 persons had been killed in Bosnia- Herzegovina—among them, roughly 160,000 Bosniaks (Muslims), 30,000 Croats, and 25,000 Serbs.(65)

Of all the memoirs under review here, those by Sefer Halilovic, commander of the Bosnian forces from 1992 to 1993, have possibly incited the most controversy. Now in its third, expanded edition, the book in its first edition provoked public attacks by Stipe Mesic and Martin Spegelj and brought before the public Halilovic’s quarrels with Bosnian President Izetbegovic. Halilovic and Izetbegovic agree on four facts: that Halilovic had been experiencing some problems of insubordination in the early months of 1993 (Halilovic adds that the insubordination was on the part of Rasim Delic); that on 8 June 1993 Izetbegovic entrusted Rasim Delic with effective command of the Bosnian army, with Halilovic remaining chief of staff but being effectively subordinated to Delic; that Izetbegovic was prepared to agree to some western-brokered peace

agreements calling for the partition of Bosnia; and that the Zulfikarpasic-Filipovic initiative of 1991, which seemed to sideline the Bosnian Croats and which Izetbegovic at first supported, would have reduced Bosnia to a mere appendage of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. Beyond these four points, however, there is little agreement between the two accounts.

At the heart of Halilovic's account is his conviction that Izetbegovic, together with Fikret Muslimovic, the one-time chief of KOS (the JNA's counterintelligence service) for Bosnia, Alija Delimustafic, the Bosnian minister of the interior in 1991, and, as it seems, Delic, were conspiring to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina because they favored the creation of a rump Muslim state. Halilovic also points out that Muslimovic was chief of KOS in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time that KOS was distributing arms to the Serbs in that republic, thus suggesting a certain support, on Muslimovic's part, for Serb territorial aspirations in that republic.(66) Halilovic also sees KOS as having been behind his removal from operational command of the army and claims that Muslimovic was originally supposed to be given command of the army, before Delic was chosen.(67)

Yet, in Halilovic's mind, Izetbegovic was not only committed to the destruction of the Bosnian state "with its 1,000-year tradition"(68) but also naive about Serbian intentions, as reflected in the Bosnian president's refusal, on two occasions, to approve plans to lay siege to JNA barracks in Bosnia (along the lines of what Spegelj proposed in Croatia). Halilovic claims that of the nine JNA barracks in Sarajevo in 1992, eight were in exposed locations where the Bosnian government could, if it had found the will, have dictated terms. But Izetbegovic had signed an agreement with the JNA and, according to Halilovic, insisted on sticking to it.(69)

In July 1993, Halilovic's flat was struck by an artillery shell; his wife and son died in the explosion. A month before, Halilovic had written a letter to the presidential council of the republic, in which he had challenged the constitutionality of Izetbegovic's decisions in restructuring the army. Halilovic is convinced that Bakir Alispahic, Bosnian minister of police, and Fikret Muslimovic, by then one of the five highest-ranking generals in the Bosnian army, were implicated in this attempt on his life.(70) In fact, on 5 October 1998, Halilovic filed a criminal complaint against Muslimovic, Alispahic, and five others, alleging that they had conspired to kill him.

As for Delimustafic, Halilovic does not implicate him in the assassination plot but claims that the Bosnian minister collaborated with Yugoslav Interior Minister Petar Gracanin in the second half of 1991, bringing into Bosnia about 100 federal inspectors, whose task was to paralyze defense preparations, carry out espionage, and engage in various acts of subversion.(71) According to Halilovic, Delimustafic also sent about 12,000 rifles, about the same time, to western Herzegovina, where these weapons ended up in the hands of the Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko Vijece Obrane, or HVO), to be used later in combat against the Bosnian army; moreover, Izetbegovic supposedly knew about this arms transfer at the time, but did nothing.(72) British scholar Marko Attila Hoare indirectly confirms this story, and he also notes that both Delimustafic and Abdic were agents for KOS.(73) Alispahic also collaborated with KOS, according to Munir Alibabic-Munja, a former agent of the State Security Service and of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.(74)

Halilovic further argues that the peace movement in Bosnia was an invention of KOS, that KOS actively encouraged Bosniaks to view their collective identity through the religious prism, that most of the army's budget after 25 June 1993 (that is, after Halilovic was effectively out of the picture) was wasted on luxury cars and electronic gadgets and other inessentials, with only a small portion actually going to purchase armaments and combat-relevant equipment, that some of Delic's military mistakes in 1993 were not mistakes at all, that the Croatian army and the HVO were on the brink of total defeat by early 1994 until Izetbegovic rescued them and the prospects for partition by signing the Washington Agreement, and that Izetbegovic unnecessarily signed the Dayton Peace Accords at a time when the Bosnian army was on the verge of capturing a large swath of territory in western Bosnia, including the key town of Banja Luka.(75) The third edition of this book includes 86 pages of appendixes designed to support his claims.

Although Izetbegovic makes no mention of Halilovic's memoirs in his recently published autobiography, parts of it read as if they were directed toward replying to criticisms voiced by the general. The Bosnian president devotes very little attention to Halilovic himself, however, characterizing him, rather briefly, as "a capable officer but a man without sufficient personal courage" and claiming, in the context of reports that the army was maltreating its Serb recruits, that Halilovic "did not have sufficient authority among the troops to be able to deal with the situation."(76) By contrast, Izetbegovic, describes Rasim Delic as "a serious man and a very educated officer."(77)

Izetbegovic, however, is not concerned with addressing the specific charges registered in Halilovic's memoirs. Rather, Izetbegovic is determined, in the first place, to establish his reputation as an advocate of a tolerant, secular, multicultural society committed to liberal democracy, equality, and fair play. Quite a number of the speeches reprinted in the book show Izetbegovic articulating these principles. In addition, Izetbegovic's volume contains full or partial texts of various newspaper interviews and diplomatic exchanges, including exchanges between himself and Croatian President Tudjman.

According to Hrvoje Sarinic, who served as chief of the Office of the President of the Republic and as chief counselor to President Tudjman during the war, what Izetbegovic wanted was neither a rump Islamic state (as Halilovic claims) nor a united, multiconfessional Bosnia (as Izetbegovic himself claims), but rather a united but Islamic Bosnia.(78) Sarinic says further that the Sarajevo government of Izetbegovic favored strengthening Islamic principles in such a way as to tend toward fundamentalism, while inexplicably characterizing Izetbegovic's electoral rival in 1990, Fikret Abdic, as a champion of a liberal citizens' state linked with the West.(79) The record of Sarinic's conversations with Milosevic and other high-ranking political figures shows that the Croatian side was deeply concerned about the Serbs and the Muslims forming an alliance at Croatian expense.(80)

Sarinic is convinced that Milosevic did not actually have any territorial pretensions vis-B-vis Croatian territory and that the Serbian leader's expansionist program was limited to Bosnia-Herzegovina.(81) Sarinic's impressions derive from conversations he held with Milosevic during the years 1993-95, by which time the military balance on the Croatian front had already turned decisively against the Serbs; these impressions, therefore, have nothing to do with Milosevic's ambitions at the start of the War.(82)

Sarinic's memoirs are full of thumbnail sketches of principals. Milosevic is "self-confident" and "arrogant."⁽⁸³⁾ Tudjman showed "vision," especially in rejecting Ambassador Peter Galbraith's "monstrous" Z-4 plan and in pressing forward with the liberation of western Slavonia in May 1995 and the Krajina in August 1995.⁽⁸⁴⁾ David Lord Owen is described as "completely lucid" and "perfidious," and as "ill-disposed toward Croats."⁽⁸⁵⁾ Sarinic has positive things to say about British Ambassador Gavin Hewitt, but he characterizes Ambassador Galbraith as "unprofessional," adding that the American ambassador's "vanity, his multitude of complexes, and his ambition constantly led him to new attempts to become an important factor."⁽⁸⁶⁾

Conclusion

On the whole, however interesting these memoirs might be, there are few spectacular revelations. Still, one might mention Drnovsek's revelation that, in the Tito era, the JNA tried for a long time to, develop nuclear weapons,⁽⁸⁷⁾ details provided by Sarinic concerning inter-Serb rivalries (for example, between Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik, one of the Bosnian Serb leaders),⁽⁸⁸⁾ and Tomac's revelation of intelligence indicating that at the beginning of October 1991, Belgrade had been preparing for an all-out assault on Croatia, to include "attacks on industrial facilities, with, the aim of causing an ecological catastrophe."⁽⁸⁹⁾ In addition, there are Mamula's disclosures that leading figures in the Ministry of Defense and in the JNA had contacted the leaders of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia- Herzegovina in late 1987 to see if these leaders could come to a consensus on what Milosevic's putsch in Serbia meant for the country and perhaps undertake some remedial action; and that Stane Dolanc, one of the highest ranking Slovenian politicians in the late Tito era and early post-Tito era, had suggested to Nikola Ljubicic, who had been elected to represent Serbia on the SFRY Presidency in 1984, that the, party presidium should discuss Milosevic's putsch;⁽⁹⁰⁾ as well as details revealed by Rudolf concerning the debate in late June and early July 1991 in Zagreb about the most sensible response to the JNA's use of force against the Slovenes.⁽⁹¹⁾ I will confess to a certain satisfaction in reading Sarinic's speculation that there was nothing political about the application of pressure on Zagreb, in 1995, not to launch military campaigns against Serb-held areas of Croatia; in Sarinic's view, the explanation is quite personal—the high-ranking representatives and mediators were being paid high salaries to carry on negotiations and if the crisis were to be resolved, their mandates would end, as would their handsome salaries.⁽⁹²⁾

In closing, I shall offer my own notions about useful literature on the subject of the Yugoslav crisis, whether memoir literature or secondary literature. For a broad view of the crisis, my own favorite volumes are Viktor Meier's *Yugoslavia*, which provides a blow-by-blow account of high politics in the final half-decade of the SFRY, setting that story in the wider context of South Slav history and exploding various self-serving myths that have circulated in the west concerning Yugoslavia, and my own *Balkan Babel*, which emphasizes the pivotal problem of political illegitimacy as the single most important root of the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia and which, in its fourth edition, covers the period from May 1980 to July 2001. Also worth mentioning is a collaborative volume edited by Dunja Melcic; majestic in its scope, her volume offers detailed analysis of the entire sweep of the history of the peoples who made up Yugoslavia, from the Middle Ages to 1999.⁽⁹³⁾

For analyses of the political disintegration of the late 1980s, the reader should turn to Branka Magas's magisterial treatment of the subject,(94) to be supplemented by the memoirs by Raif Dizdarevic and Janez Drnovsek, as well as Nebojsa Popov's Road to War in Serbia.(95) For the years 1990-91, including the war in Croatia, the memoirs by Martin Spegelj, Stipe Mesic, (Kako smo rusili Jugoslaviju), and Borisav Jovic (Poslednji dani SFRJ) are crucial. For the Slovenian front, the memoirs by Janez Drnovsek and Janez Jansa are a good place to start, with the memoirs by Dizdarevic and Branko Mamula offering not-very-believable alternative perspectives on some events in Slovenia. For the Bosnian war, neither the Izetbegovic nor the Halilovic volume can qualify as "essential," except for the specialist. The best treatments of the war are, in my view, those by Silber and Little (Death of Yugoslavia), which, in its revised version, covers the period from 1988 to the close of the war, Norman Cigar, Lukic and Lynch, Magas and Zanic (which also covers the fighting in Slovenia and Croatia), and Joze Pirjevec (which covers the fighting from 1991 to 1999).(96) These, in turn, may be supplemented by reading Cushman's trenchant little volume (Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia), the sobering analysis of the American media's treatment of the war in Bosnia, exhaustively researched and convincingly presented by James Sadkovich, the recent analysis of Herceg-Bosna by Ciril Ribicic (including the transcript of a meeting between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and leading figures in the Bosnian branch of the Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica [Croatian Democratic Community] held on 27 December 1991), Mark Thompson's brilliant analysis of the media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in its significantly expanded second edition, and volumes issued by the Bosnian Institute.(97) Hrvoje Sarinic's recollections of his conversations with Milosevic and other high-ranking officials will also prove useful to those wishing to obtain a glimpse into diplomatic negotiations at the time of the Bosnian war, while the sophisticated overview of Bosnian history by the distinguished historians Robert J. Donia and John Fine is an excellent resource for those interested in the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina.(98) On Germany's much disputed role in the crisis, I refer the reader to Conversi's short monograph (German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia) and to a collaborative essay published in Problems of post-Communism.(99)

And on the Serbian side of things, I refer the reader to the very balanced political biography of Milosevic written by Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, the repeatedly myopic but always useful analysis of Milosevic and Markovic written by veteran Serbian journalist Slavoljub Djukic, Norman Cigar's perspicacious assessment of the new Yugoslav president, Vojislav Kostunica, and my own Wilson Center paper about the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992-2001.(100) Among the volumes treating the Kosovo crisis of 1998-99, the thick volume assembled by Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing is in a class by itself.(101) This exhaustive and comprehensive collection may be supplemented by Thomas Schmid's very professional volume put together soon after the inception of the North American Treaty Organization's aerial campaign against the former Republic of Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999, and the collection edited by Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig.(102) For some historical perspective on Kosovo, the reader may turn to the exhaustive history written by Noel Malcolm with its detailed treatment of earlier centuries, the compact overview of Kosovar history up to the dawn of the Milosevic era by Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, the highly detailed account of Albanian discontent from 1945 to 1985 by Milos Misovic, which is perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of its subject, the fair-minded treatment of Albanian and Serb understandings of events in Kosovo by Julie Mertus, based on extensive interviewing in the province, and the elegantly written and highly detailed

account of the lead-up to the crisis of 1998-99 by Tim Judah.(103) This list of recommendations is not exhaustive, but, to my mind at least, it represents the most useful introduction to the subject and can assist the reader in avoiding misunderstandings.

Notes

1. For an effective rebuttal of Germanophobic accounts of the Yugoslav war, see Daniele Conversi, *German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*, *The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies*, no. 16 (Seattle, 1998); the term Hobbist is reserved for notions that are inspired by the writings of Thomas Hobbes but that offer oversimplified understandings of Hobbes's ideas. The usual term for describing concepts more or less true to Hobbes's inspiration is Hobb'sian (or Hobbesian); for a concise and lucid explanation of "cynicism" and an effective rebuttal, see Thomas Cushman, *Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia*, *The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies*, no. 13 (Seattle, 1997).

2. Stipe Mesic, *Kako smo rusili Jugoslaviju* (Zagreb, 1992), the second edition was published under the revised title, *Kako je srusena Jugoslavija* (Zagreb, 1994); Veljko Kadijevic, *Moje vidjenje raspada* (Belgrade, 1993); Borisav Jovic, *Poslednji dani SFRJ: Izvodi iz dnevnika* (Belgrade, 1995).

3. Milorad Tomanic, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj* (Belgrade, 2001), 37-43, 73.

4. Raif Dizdarevic, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije: Svjedocenja* (Sarajevo, 1999), 49.

5. *Ibid.*, 54.

6. *Ibid.*, 90.

7. *Ibid.*, 187.

8. *Ibid.*, 202.

9. *Ibid.*, 210-12.

10. See *ibid.*, 217.

11. *Ibid.*, 223.

12. *Ibid.*, 297.

13. *Ibid.*, 436-37.

14. *Ibid.*, 420.

15. Ibid., 437.
16. Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise*, trans. from German by Sabrina P. Ramet (London, 1999), 68, 90, and 107.
17. Davorin Rudolf, *Rat koji nismo htjeli: Hrvatska 1991* (Zagreb, 1999), 41.
18. Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London, 1995), 157.
19. Branko Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija* (Podgorica, 2000), 15-16.
20. Ibid., 16.
21. Ibid., 17.
22. Ibid., 61.
23. Martin Spegelj, "Prva faza rata 1990-1992: Pripreme JNA za agresiju i hrvatski obrambeni planovi," in Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic, eds., *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1991-1995* (Zagreb, 1999), 46.
24. Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija*, 76 -77.
25. Ibid., 115.
26. Ibid., 117.
27. Ibid., 128.
28. See, for example, the account offered in Meier, *Yugoslavia*, 62-67, based on a conversation with Slovenian President Milan Kucan in November 1993 and on documents held in the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia.
29. Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija*, 124.
30. Ibid., 109.
31. See the partial list of such unconstitutional and illegal moves in Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic*, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colo., 2002, 71-72.
32. Janez Jansa, *The Making of the Slovenian State 1988-1992: The Collapse of Yugoslavia*, trans. AMIDAS d.o.o, ed. Aleksandar Zorn (Ljubljana, 1994), 250.
33. See Meier, *Yugoslavia*, 65-67.

34. Jansa, *Making of the Slovenian State*, 124 -25.
35. *Ibid.*, 139.
36. Janez Drnovsek, *Der Jugoslawien-Krieg: Meine Wahrheit*, trans. Doris Debeniak (Kilchberg, Switz., 1998), 243-45.
37. *Ibid.*, 5. In 1998, after the publication of the German translation of Drnovsek's memoirs, Jansa was offered the opportunity to review the book for the prestigious German newspaper, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. Jansa lost no time in pointing out that Drnovsek was not a political outsider, as might be supposed from *Der Jugoslawien-Krieg*, but a deputy in the Yugoslav Assembly and also a member of the League of Communists. According to Jansa, Drnovsek had also had contacts with the Yugoslav secret police; Jansa suggests further that Drnovsek's selection to run for president was no accident. In Jansa's account, Drnovsek emerges as less than resolute, raising his voice against the JNA's expropriation of Slovenian weaponry—according to Jansa—only after a huge clamor from the Slovenian public. Jansa further charges that there are a number of misrepresentations in the book, including about where Drnovsek spent, 29-30 November 1989, and closes his review by firing a broadside against Drnovsek's title: if the book tells only "his truth" ("Meine Wahrheit" means "My truth") then, Jansa charges, it follows that Drnovsek does not believe in "the truth." *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14 October 1998, 10. Drnovsek's reply to this attack, published in the same newspaper more than a month later, passes over several of Jansa's points, but Drnovsek insists that he reacted to the expropriations immediately. Drnovsek also claims that he was instrumental, in his post in the SFRY Presidency, in keeping the JNA at bay until late June 1991. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 25 November 1998, 11. Jansa was granted the final word in this exchange. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 9 December 1998, 14.
38. Dizdarevic, *Od smrti Tita*, 243.
39. Zdravko Tomac, *The Struggle for the Croatian State ... through Hell to Democracy*, trans. Profikon (Zagreb, 1993), 253.
40. *Ibid.*, 270.
41. *Ibid.*, 96.
42. *Ibid.*, 149n 1.
43. *Ibid.*, 338-39.
44. Anton Tus, "Rat u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoji do Sarajevskog primirja," in Magas and Zanic, eds., *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini*, 81- 82.
45. Tomac, *Struggle for the Croatian State*, 87.

46. Martin Spegelj, *Sjecanja vojnika*, ed. Ivo Zanic (Zagreb, 2001), 302; and Drago Pilsel, "Rados je novi Susak" (An interview with Martin Spegelj), *Feral Tribune* (Split), no. 840 (20 October 2001): 40.
47. Tomac, *Struggle for the Croatian State*, 287, 289 -90.
48. Joze Pirjevec, *La guerre jugoslave 1991-1999* (Torino, 2001), 110; Spegelj, *Sjecanja vojnika*, 292; and Tus, "Rat u Sloveniji," 78.
49. Tomac, *Struggle for the Croatian State*, 417.
50. *Ibid.*, 418.
51. Spegelj, *Sjecanja vojnika*, 218-19.
52. *Ibid.*, 219, 375.
53. Konrad Kolsek, *Spomini: Na zacetek oborozenega spopada v Jugoslaviji 1991* (Maribor, 2001); Spegelj, "Prva faza rata," 49-50.
54. Spegelj, *Sjecanja vojnika*, 241.
55. *Ibid.*, 257
56. *Ibid.*, 239.
57. *Ibid.*, 292.
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(Reprinted from *Slavic Review*, vol. 61, no. 3, Fall 2002, pp. 558-580.)

FILM

This spring, Croatian documentary film "Decko kome se zurilo" (Miljana Cakic-Veselic and Nenad Puhovski, Factum, Zagreb) has received the first prize at the international "Images Festival" in Toronto, Ontario.

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